IPSEC(4) | MidnightBSD Kernel Interfaces Manual | IPSEC(4) |
ipsec
— Internet
Protocol Security protocol
options IPSEC
options IPSEC_SUPPORT
device crypto
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
#include
<netipsec/ipsec6.h>
ipsec
is a security protocol implemented
within the Internet Protocol layer of the networking stack.
ipsec
is defined for both IPv4 and IPv6
(inet(4) and
inet6(4)).
ipsec
is a set of protocols, ESP (for Encapsulating
Security Payload) AH (for Authentication Header), and IPComp (for IP Payload
Compression Protocol) that provide security services for IP datagrams. AH
both authenticates and guarantees the integrity of an IP packet by attaching
a cryptographic checksum computed using one-way hash functions. ESP, in
addition, prevents unauthorized parties from reading the payload of an IP
packet by also encrypting it. IPComp tries to increase communication
performance by compressing IP payload, thus reducing the amount of data
sent. This will help nodes on slow links but with enough computing power.
ipsec
operates in one of two modes: transport mode
or tunnel mode. Transport mode is used to protect peer-to-peer communication
between end nodes. Tunnel mode encapsulates IP packets within other IP
packets and is designed for security gateways such as VPN endpoints.
System configuration requires the crypto(4) subsystem.
The packets can be passed to a virtual enc(4) interface, to perform packet filtering before outbound encryption and after decapsulation inbound.
To properly filter on the inner packets of an
ipsec
tunnel with firewalls, you can change the
values of the following sysctls
Name | Default | Enable |
net.inet.ipsec.filtertunnel | 0 | 1 |
net.inet6.ipsec6.filtertunnel | 0 | 1 |
ipsec
is controlled by a key management
and policy engine, that reside in the operating system kernel. Key
management is the process of associating keys with security associations,
also know as SAs. Policy management dictates when new security associations
created or destroyed.
The key management engine can be accessed from userland by using
PF_KEY
sockets. The PF_KEY
socket API is defined in RFC2367.
The policy engine is controlled by an extension to the
PF_KEY
API,
setsockopt(2)
operations, and sysctl(3)
interface. The kernel implements an extended version of the
PF_KEY
interface and allows the programmer to define
IPsec policies which are similar to the per-packet filters. The
setsockopt(2)
interface is used to define per-socket behavior, and
sysctl(3) interface is
used to define host-wide default behavior.
The kernel code does not implement a dynamic encryption key
exchange protocol such as IKE (Internet Key Exchange). Key exchange
protocols are beyond what is necessary in the kernel and should be
implemented as daemon processes which call the
APIs.
IPsec policies can be managed in one of two ways, either by
configuring per-socket policies using the
setsockopt(2) system
calls, or by configuring kernel level packet filter-based policies using the
PF_KEY
interface, via the
setkey(8) you can define
IPsec policies against packets using rules similar to packet filtering
rules. Refer to setkey(8)
on how to use it.
Depending on the socket's address family, IPPROTO_IP or IPPROTO_IPV6 transport level and IP_IPSEC_POLICY or IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket options may be used to configure per-socket security policies. A properly-formed IPsec policy specification structure can be created using ipsec_set_policy(3) function and used as socket option value for the setsockopt(2) call.
When setting policies using the
setkey(8) command, the
“default
” option instructs the system
to use its default policy, as explained below, for processing packets. The
following sysctl variables are available for configuring the system's IPsec
behavior. The variables can have one of two values. A
1
means “use
”,
which means that if there is a security association then use it but if there
is not then the packets are not processed by IPsec. The value
2
is synonymous with
“require
”, which requires that a
security association must exist for the packets to move, and not be dropped.
These terms are defined in
ipsec_set_policy(8).
Name | Type | Changeable |
net.inet.ipsec.esp_trans_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.esp_net_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.ah_trans_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.ah_net_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.esp_trans_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.esp_net_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.ah_trans_deflev | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.ah_net_deflev | integer | yes |
If the kernel does not find a matching, system wide, policy then
the default value is applied. The system wide default policy is specified by
the following sysctl(8)
variables. 0
means
“discard
” which asks the kernel to
drop the packet. 1
means
“none
”.
Name | Type | Changeable |
net.inet.ipsec.def_policy | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.def_policy | integer | yes |
When the ipsec
protocols are configured
for use, all protocols are included in the system. To selectively
enable/disable protocols, use
sysctl(8).
Name | Default |
net.inet.esp.esp_enable | On |
net.inet.ah.ah_enable | On |
net.inet.ipcomp.ipcomp_enable | On |
In addition the following variables are accessible via sysctl(8), for tweaking the kernel's IPsec behavior:
Name | Type | Changeable |
net.inet.ipsec.ah_cleartos | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.ah_offsetmask | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.dfbit | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.ecn | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.debug | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.natt_cksum_policy | integer | yes |
net.inet.ipsec.check_policy_history | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.ecn | integer | yes |
net.inet6.ipsec6.debug | integer | yes |
The variables are interpreted as follows:
ipsec.ah_cleartos
ipsec.ah_offsetmask
ipsec.dfbit
ipsec.ecn
draft-ietf-ipsec-ecn-02.txt
.
gif(4) talks more about
the behavior.ipsec.debug
ipsec.natt_cksum_policy
ipsec.check_policy_history
Variables under the net.inet6.ipsec6
tree
have similar meanings to those described above.
The ipsec
protocol acts as a plug-in to
the inet(4) and
inet6(4) protocols and
therefore supports most of the protocols defined upon those IP-layer
protocols. The icmp(4) and
icmp6(4) protocols may
behave differently with ipsec
because
ipsec
can prevent
icmp(4) or
icmp6(4) routines from
looking into the IP payload.
ioctl(2), socket(2), ipsec_set_policy(3), crypto(4), enc(4), if_ipsec(4), icmp6(4), intro(4), ip6(4), setkey(8), sysctl(8)
S. Kent and R. Atkinson, IP Authentication Header, RFC 2404.
S. Kent and R. Atkinson, IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC 2406.
Daniel L. McDonald, Craig Metz, and Bao G. Phan, PF_KEY Key Management API, Version 2, RFC, 2367.
D. L. McDonald, A Simple IP Security API Extension to BSD Sockets, internet draft, draft-mcdonald-simple-ipsec-api-03.txt, work in progress material.
The original ipsec
implementation appeared
in the WIDE/KAME IPv6/IPsec stack.
For FreeBSD 5.0 a fully locked IPsec implementation called fast_ipsec was brought in. The protocols drew heavily on the OpenBSD implementation of the IPsec protocols. The policy management code was derived from the KAME implementation found in their IPsec protocols. The fast_ipsec implementation lacked ip6(4) support but made use of the crypto(4) subsystem.
For FreeBSD 7.0
ip6(4) support was added to
fast_ipsec. After this the old KAME IPsec implementation was dropped and
fast_ipsec became what now is the only ipsec
implementation in FreeBSD.
There is no single standard for the policy engine API, so the policy engine API described herein is just for this implementation.
AH and tunnel mode encapsulation may not work as you might expect.
If you configure inbound “require” policy with an AH tunnel or
any IPsec encapsulating policy with AH (like
“esp/tunnel/A-B/use
ah/transport/A-B/require
”), tunnelled packets will be
rejected. This is because the policy check is enforced on the inner packet
on reception, and AH authenticates encapsulating (outer) packet, not the
encapsulated (inner) packet (so for the receiving kernel there is no sign of
authenticity). The issue will be solved when we revamp our policy engine to
keep all the packet decapsulation history.
When a large database of security associations or policies is
present in the kernel the SADB_DUMP
and
SADB_SPDDUMP
operations on
PF_KEY
sockets may fail due to lack of space.
Increasing the socket buffer size may alleviate this problem.
The IPcomp protocol may occasionally error because of zlib(3) problems.
This documentation needs more review.
February 6, 2017 | midnightbsd-3.1 |